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We tested if post-decisional emotions of regret, guilt, shame, anger, and disgust can
account for individuals’ choices in moral dilemmas depicting the choice of letting some
people die (non-utilitarian option) or sacrificing one person to save them (utilitarian
option). We collected participants’ choices and post-decisional emotional ratings for
each option using Footbridge-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice of one person is
the means to save more people, and Trolley-type dilemmas, in which the sacrifice is
only a side effect. Moreover, we computed the EEG Readiness Potential to test if the
neural activity related to the last phase of decision-making was related to the emotional
conflict. Participants reported generally stronger emotions for the utilitarian as compared
to the non-utilitarian options, with the exception of anger and regret, which in Trolley-
type dilemmas were stronger for the non-utilitarian option. Moreover, participants tended
to choose the option that minimized the intensity of negative emotions, irrespective of
dilemma type. No significant relationship between emotions and the amplitude of the
Readiness Potential emerged. It is possible that anticipated post-decisional emotions
play a role in earlier stages of decision-making.
Keywords: moral dilemma, emotion, decision-making, readiness potential
INTRODUCTION
In the last 15 years, moral dilemmas have been widely employed in psychology and neuroscience
to investigate the interplay between emotional and cognitive processes in moral judgment and
decision-making. In the Trolley dilemma, a runaway railway trolley is about to run over a group
of five unaware workers. The only way to save them is to pull a lever and divert the trolley onto
another rail, where a single worker stands, who would be run over instead. In the Footbridge
dilemma, the only way to save the five is to push a large stranger off an overpass, so that his
body would stop the trolley. It is a well-known and widely replicated result that individuals usually
endorse the choice to sacrifice one person to save five lives in the Trolley dilemma, but not in the
Footbridge dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001; Schaich Borg et al., 2006; Hauser et al., 2007; Sarlo et al.,
2012).
According to Greene et al. (2001, 2004) dual process model, this pattern of findings is due to
the fact that moral judgments and decisions are driven by two systems in competition: a slow,
deliberate, and rational system, that would perform a cost-benefit analysis and lead individuals
to endorse the option that maximizes the number of spared lives – the so-called utilitarian
resolution of the dilemmas – and a fast, automatic, and emotional system, that would work like
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a sort of “alarm bell” producing an immediate negative reaction
against the proposed action (i.e., killing a man), leading
individuals to reject the utilitarian resolution. According to
the dual process model, when the sacrifice of one person is
particularly aversive – like in the Footbridge dilemma – the
emotional system would prevail over the rational one and push
toward the rejection of the utilitarian choice.
Starting from this model, several studies tested the hypothesis
that emotional processing plays a major role in moral decisions
and judgments, yielding generally consistent results: for instance,
the resolution of Footbridge-type dilemmas elicits greater activity
in brain areas associated with emotional processing, like the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), the superior temporal
sulcus (STS), and the amygdala, as compared to Trolley-type
dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004, 2001). Furthermore, individuals
with emotional hyporeactivity (e.g., participants with high
psychopathy traits, or vmPFC impairments) show a higher
endorsement of utilitarian options as compared to control
participants (e.g., Koenigs et al., 2007, 2012; Moretto et al., 2010;
Pletti et al., 2016).
Given this evidence, we might expect individuals to experience
a more negative emotional state while deciding in Footbridge-
as compared to Trolley-type dilemmas. Moreover, we might
expect that a more intense negative emotional state would be
related to a lower percentage of utilitarian choices. However,
evidence of an association between self-report ratings of the
emotional state experienced by participants and moral judgments
or choices has been mixed: of the few studies that collected
participants’ emotional evaluations during the task (Choe and
Min, 2011; Sarlo et al., 2012; Lotto et al., 2014; Szekely and
Miu, 2015; Horne and Powell, 2016), only one (Horne and
Powell, 2016) reported an association between emotions and
moral judgment, and none reported an association between
emotional ratings and choices. In a study by Krosch et al. (2012)
that used realistic military scenarios, participants that reported
having based their choices on their emotional reaction were more
likely to choose a “humanitarian” option (protecting civilians
from being attacked) over a “military” one (not acting in order
to preserve neutrality). Despite this, however, the differences in
the emotional states associated with the two options did not
predict the choices. Thus, the relationship between subjectively
experienced emotions and decisions in moral dilemmas is still
unclear. Shedding light on this aspect would provide important
information in understanding how emotion influences moral
decisions.
It is important to note that the aforementioned studies (with
the exception of Krosch et al., 2012) focused on the immediate
emotions that participants experienced at the moment of the
decision, and did not examine the role played by anticipating
post-decisional emotional consequences. This is a relevant point,
because according to several models of decision-making like
the regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982),
the disappointment theory (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden,
1986), and the decision affect theory (Mellers et al., 1999), the
anticipation of post-decisional emotions has a crucial impact on
decisions. According to these models, during decision-making,
individuals try to predict how they would feel after having chosen
each of the different alternatives, and then select the option
that minimizes the anticipated negative emotions. In particular,
individuals are especially motivated to avoid post-decisional
feelings of regret, arising when the outcome of the chosen option
is worse than what would have resulted from the alternative
options, and feelings of guilt, entailing self-condemning feelings
elicited by causing harm or distress to others (Tangney et al.,
1996; Haidt, 2003). The need to avoid guilt strongly influences
decision-making when the individual’s decisions have relevant
consequences for others: in particular, guilt aversion motivates
individuals to act cooperatively (Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003; de
Hooge et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2011) and to avoid deception
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).
It is therefore plausible that in moral dilemmas decisions
could be driven by the attempt to minimize post-decisional
negative emotions. In line with this hypothesis, it has been
reported that the percentage of utilitarian choices endorsed
in Footbridge-type moral dilemmas is inversely predicted by
individuals’ disposition to experience personal distress when
faced with the suffering of others (Sarlo et al., 2014). Furthermore,
a recent study investigating post-decisional emotions arising
from moral dilemmas suggests that, in Footbridge-type dilemmas
only, participants’ choices seem to be aimed at minimizing post-
decisional regret (Tasso et al., unpublished). In particular, the
greater the regret experienced after the counterfactual decision
relative to the regret experienced after the non-utilitarian actual
decision, the higher the number of non-utilitarian choices in
Footbridge-type dilemmas. However, the above study did not
directly compare the emotions related to the utilitarian and non-
utilitarian options between the two dilemma types. Thus, it is still
not known whether the utilitarian option is indeed associated to
higher emotional intensities in Footbridge- than in Trolley-type
dilemmas.
The present study aimed at systematically comparing the
post-decisional emotions associated with the utilitarian and
non-utilitarian options in Footbridge-type and Trolley-type
dilemmas, irrespective of participants’ choices, by focusing
on whether the difference between the two emotional states
could predict participants’ choices. We hypothesized that, if
participants anticipate the emotional consequence of a decision
and use this information to guide their choices, then the
difference between the emotions associated with the two options
should predict participants’ choices.
A second, independent, goal of this study was to identify
a possible electrophysiological correlate of the conflict between
anticipated emotional consequences during the resolution of
the dilemmas. We focused on the last phase of the decision-
making process, in which an option is selected and the
corresponding action is implemented (Ernst and Paulus, 2005),
and we analyzed the readiness potential (RP), a slow negative
EEG wave that is observed before the execution of a voluntary
movement. The RP recorded over the central electrode Cz
reflects an increase in the cortical excitability of brain areas
involved in the preparation of movement, like the supplementary
motor area (SMA) and the pre-motor cortex (Shibasaki and
Hallett, 2006). Indeed, besides being involved in the preparation
and selection of actions (Rushworth et al., 2004), the SMA
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plays a crucial role in value-based decision-making, being
involved in reward anticipation (Lee, 2004) and in the encoding
of the reward value associated with an action (Wunderlich
et al., 2009). In line with these functions of the SMA,
some recent findings demonstrated that the RP tracks the
emergence of value-based decisions and reflects the readiness
to provide a response in a decision-making task (Gluth et al.,
2013).
The RP also seems to have an important role in moral
decisions, since it might reflect the conflict that is inherent in
these decisions. Indeed, lower amplitudes of the RP were reported
for Footbridge-type as compared to Trolley-type dilemmas,
reflecting lower preparation to respond, possibly due to a
greater conflict between alternative options (Sarlo et al., 2012).
Consistent with this finding, an fMRI study reported greater
SMA activation for Trolley-type as compared to Footbridge-type
dilemmas (Schaich Borg et al., 2006). Finally, another EEG study
found a smaller RP amplitude for deception than for truth telling
(Panasiti et al., 2014), which can also be related to moral conflict.
Taken together, these results suggest a relationship between
the amplitude of the RP and the intensity of conflict in moral
situations. Thus, in the present study we aimed at testing if the
conflict reflected in the amplitude of the RP has an emotional
nature, and reflects the degree with which individuals comply
with their emotional evaluations in making their decisions. To
this aim, we measured emotional experiences related to both
the chosen and the unchosen option for each dilemma, and we
calculated an index of conflict between participants’ decision
and their emotional evaluations, testing its association to the RP
amplitude.
To summarize, the main aim of the present study was to test
the influence of anticipated emotional consequences on decisions
in moral dilemmas. We hypothesized that in Footbridge-type
dilemmas, but not in Trolley-type dilemmas, the utilitarian
option would be associated with more negative emotional
consequences as compared to the non-utilitarian option. This
would contribute to explain why in Footbridge-type dilemmas
people reject the rational option that maximizes the number of
saved lives, whereas in Trolley-type dilemmas people endorse it.
Furthermore, we hypothesized that participants would choose the
option associated with the lowest emotional cost, and we expected
this effect to emerge for Footbridge-type dilemmas only, since in
Trolley-type dilemmas the emotional cost between options is not
so different to critically influence decisions.
We focused on different emotions: guilt and shame, which
are two of the most prototypical moral emotions (Haidt, 2003);
disgust and anger, which are two basic emotions typically elicited
by moral violations (Haidt, 2003); and finally, regret, which is
a crucial decision-related emotion elicited by comparing the
outcome of choices. For each dilemma, we collected self-report
measures of the emotional state experienced by participants
relative to both the utilitarian and the non-utilitarian option,
and we tested whether participants chose the option associated
with the lower emotional cost. Finally, we recorded the RP
time-locked to the moment of choice, to test whether it
reflects an emotional conflict developing during the decision-
making.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifty-six healthy participants aged 19–26 years completed the
task. All participants were right-handed and had no history of
psychiatric or neurological disorders, and they were paid €13 for
their participation. Three participants were excluded for non-
compliance with the instructions, and two because they already
had previous knowledge of moral dilemmas. The final sample
for behavioral and subjective data was thus composed of 51
participants (30 F, mean age= 22.40 years, SD= 1.71).
Participants were randomly assigned to a Trolley group
(which was presented with primarily Trolley-type dilemmas)
or a Footbridge group (which was presented with primarily
Footbridge-type dilemmas), which were comparable for mean
age and male/female ratio. Due to excessive EEG artifacts, eight
additional participants were excluded, and the final sample for
the EEG analysis was composed of 43 participants (Trolley group:
N = 21, 11 F, mean age= 22.9 years, SD= 1.41; Footbridge group:
N = 22, 12 F, mean age= 22.27 years, SD= 1.69).
Stimuli
We used a set of 60 standardized dilemmas (Lotto et al., 2014)
including 30 Footbridge-type dilemmas, which described killing
one individual as an intended means to save others, and 30
Trolley-type dilemmas, which described killing one individual
as a foreseen but unintended consequence of saving others1. All
dilemmas were presented as written text on three consecutive
slides: the scenario described the context, in which a threat
endangers several people’s lives; option A described the non-
utilitarian choice, in which the agent lets these people die; option
B described the utilitarian choice, in which the agent kills one
person to save these people. Additionally, one counterfactual
slide was presented for each dilemma depending on the decision
made by the participant. This slide described the consequences
of the unchosen option in terms of number of deaths and lives
(Table 1).
Four additional moral dilemmas, which involved no deaths
and described other moral issues (e.g., stealing, lying, and being
dishonest), were used as filler stimuli to avoid automaticity in the
responses, and were not analyzed.
Stimulus presentation was accomplished with E-prime
software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2012).
Procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants read and signed
an informed consent form and, after that the elastic cap for
1This dilemma set differs from the “personal-impersonal” dilemma set originally
developed by Greene et al. (2001, 2004) in a few key respects. Here, the main
criterion according to which the dilemmas are divided into Footbridge- or Trolley-
type categories is based on the intentional structure of the proposed actions.
Furthermore, several confounding factors have been excluded, as these dilemmas
only address the issues of killing and letting die, rather than other moral issues, and
do not include children, friends, or relatives in the scenarios. Lastly, mean number
of words and number of text characters have been fully balanced between the two
categories. Detailed information on the criteria used to develop this set of stimuli
can be found in Sarlo et al. (2012) and in Lotto et al. (2014).
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TABLE 1 | Sample stimuli used in the task.
Sample Trolley- and Footbridge-type dilemmas.
Scenario Option A (non-utilitarian) Option B (utilitarian) Counterfactual statement
after choice “A”
Counterfactual statement
after choice “B”
Trolley-type dilemma
You are a fireman who is trying
to save some people trapped in
a fire which has broken out on
the 20th floor of a skyscraper,
which is luckily deserted. Six
people are trapped in a room
on the 21st floor and are
already beginning to suffocate
from the smoke, while one
person is coming down alone
from the 19th floor on foot.
You let the fire reach the
21st floor of the skyscraper.
The six people on that floor
will die.
You activate the automatic
closure of the fire doors.
You know that this will
mean that the person
coming down will be unable
to escape from the
building. He will die, but it
will give you time to save
the other six.
If you had activated the
closure, the person
coming down from the
building would be dead
and the other six would
be alive.
If you hadn’t activated
the closure, the six
people would be dead
and the one that was
coming down would be
alive.
Footbridge-type dilemma
You are carrying out research
into the behavior of lions in the
Savannah of Central Africa.
From an observation tower, you
can see four people hide
behind a bush. They are being
followed by a lion and are trying
to get away from it. The lion has
seen them and is heading for
the bush. Another person has
been able to climb the
observation tower.
You let the ferocious lion
reach the four people
hidden behind the bush.
They will be mauled to
death.
You push off the person
who has climbed the tower
so that the lion is drawn
toward him. You know that
this person will be mauled
to death, but the other four
will have time to escape.
If you had pushed the
person off the tower,
the person on the tower
would be dead and the
four hiding behind the
bush would be alive.
If you had not pushed
the person off the
tower, the four people
behind the bush would
be dead and the one
on the tower would be
alive.
After reading the scenario and both options participant had to choose between options A and B. If they chose option A, the counterfactual statement for option B was
presented. If they chose option B, the counterfactual statement for option A was presented.
EEG recordings was applied, received instructions for the task.
We chose not to administer the whole 60-dilemma set to
each participant, because the task would have lasted more
than 2 h and would have been excessively repetitive and
tiring for the participants, thus compromising the reliability
of their performance. However, to compute the Movement
Related Potentials (MRPs), of which the RP is a component, a
minimum of 30 trials per condition is needed. For this reason,
participants in the Footbridge group were presented with 30
Footbridge-type dilemmas, 10 Trolley-type dilemmas, and four
fillers; participants in the Trolley group were presented with 30
Trolley-type dilemmas, 10 Footbridge-type dilemmas, and four
fillers. We then used Footbridge-type trials only to compute the
RP for the Footbridge group, and Trolley-type trials only to
compute the RP for the Trolley group (see Analysis for details).
Dilemmas were divided in two blocks and presented in a
pseudo-randomized order, so that each block comprised 15
dilemmas of the main category for the group, five dilemmas
of the other category, and two fillers. In each trial, participants
read the three text slides describing the scenario and the two
options at their own pace and advanced by pressing the spacebar.
Then, a fixation cross appeared on screen, and participants were
instructed to decide between the two options by pressing one of
two computer keys marked “A” and “B” with the index or the
middle finger of the right hand. The fixation cross remained on
the screen until participants responded, for a maximum time of
10 s, plus one additional second after the response (to prevent
the MRPs to be contaminated by the event-related potentials
associated with the offset of the slide). Then, participants rated
how they felt after the decision on six 0–6 Likert scales indicating
the intensity of six emotions: anger, disgust, guilt, action regret2,
inaction regret, and shame. Participants were instructed to choose
0 when they did not experience the emotion at all, and 6
when they experienced the emotion at a maximal intensity.
Subsequently, participants read the counterfactual slide, which
described the consequences of the alternative, unchosen, option
(Table 1) and rated how they would have felt if they had
chosen the alternative option on the same six emotional scales,
presented in random order (Figure 1). This procedure allowed
us to collect for each trial an emotional state associated to
the chosen option and an emotional state associated to the
unchosen one. Moreover, by labeling the ratings according to
the option to which they were associated, we also obtained
for each trial a post-decisional emotional state, associated to
2We employed both “action” and “inaction” regret because the emotion of regret
does not have an univocal translation in the Italian language: in Italian, regret
can be translated into three main words: rimorso, which is more related to
action; rimpianto, which is more related to inaction, and rammarico, which is
generally related to bad outcomes (Giorgetta et al., 2012). We chose to focus
on the first two emotional labels, because they are differentially influenced by
agency and responsibility (Giorgetta et al., 2012), and thus can be hypothesized
to be differentially elicited by the utilitarian and non-utilitarian options in moral
dilemmas.
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in the experiment. Participants had to decide between Options A and B by pressing the corresponding key during the
presentation of the decision slide (in gray). Then, they had to rate how they felt after having chosen. Afterward, they were presented with a counterfactual slide
describing what would have happened if they had chosen the alternative option. Finally, they had to rate how they would have felt if they had chosen the alternative
option. Movement Related Potentials (MRPs) were recorded time-locked to the behavioral response, during the decision slide.
the utilitarian option and one associated to the non-utilitarian
option.
The stimuli were displayed on a 19 inches monitor at a viewing
distance of 100 cm, and the experimental task started after three
practice trials. The task lasted about 1 h, plus half-an-hour
preparation time.
Data Reduction and Analysis
Subjective and behavioral data were analyzed with mixed effect
models, including all trials for each participants except the filler
trials, those trials in which participants did not respond in time
(total N = 33, maximum N per participant = 6), and one trial
with a response time <120 ms, which was considered as an
anticipation. For these analyses, as opposed to those performed
on MRPs (see below), all dilemmas were included in the analysis
for every participant, irrespective of the group. This was possible
because behavioral and subjective data were analyzed using
mixed effect models, which do not require the same number of
observations for each cell of the design. For these analyses, the
Dilemma Type factor was a within-participants variable, and the
data were analyzed irrespective of participants’ group.
First of all, to investigate whether the emotions associated
with the utilitarian and non-utilitarian options differed, and
whether this difference was modulated by dilemma type, we
built a separate mixed effect linear regression model for each
emotion, with emotional intensity as dependent variable, the
Option to which the emotion was associated (utilitarian, non-
utilitarian), Dilemma Type (Trolley-type, Footbridge-type) and
Option×Dilemma Type as fixed effects, and participant and item
(i.e., the single dilemma) as random effects.
To investigate whether the type of dilemma influenced the
probability of choosing the utilitarian option, we built a mixed
effect logistic regression model with choice (0 = non-utilitarian,
1 = utilitarian) as dependent variable, Dilemma Type as fixed
effect, and participant and item as random effects.
Finally, to investigate whether participants chose the option
that was associated with the lowest emotional intensities and
whether this effect was modulated by the type of dilemma,
we calculated for each trial and each emotion a differential
intensity index by subtracting the intensities associated with the
non-utilitarian option from those associated with the utilitarian
option. Then, we built mixed effect logistic regression models
with choice as dependent variable, Emotional Intensity Difference,
Dilemma Type, and Emotional Intensity Difference × Dilemma
Type as fixed effects, and participant and item as random
effects. Since we were interested in the specific effect of each
single emotion, we calculated separate models for each emotion
calculated trial by trial. For all these analyses, the emotional
ratings were categorized based on the option to which they were
associated, irrespective of whether they were provided after the
choice or after the counterfactual statement. For each analysis,
we started with the model including only the random effects
and then introduced the fixed effects one by one, in the order
described above. To compare models, we used the log-likelihood
ratio test. To test the significance of parameters of the fixed
effects, Wald z tests were used for logistic models and t-test
with the Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom for
linear models.
As for electrophysiological data, the EEG was recorded
from nine tin electrodes (Fz, Cz, Pz, F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4)
embedded in an elastic cap and a tin electrode applied on
the right mastoid (Electro-Cap International, Inc.; Eaton, OH,
USA). All impedances were kept below 10 k, and the left
mastoid was used as reference. All sites were re-referenced off-
line to the average of the left and right mastoids. Vertical
and horizontal electro-oculogram were recorded from additional
electrodes placed above and below the left eye and at the
external canthi of both eyes, with the left mastoid as online
reference and off-line bipolar re-referencing. The signal was
amplified with a BrainVision V-Amp amplifier (Brain Products
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GmbH, Gilching, Germany), bandpass filtered (DC - 70 Hz) and
digitized at 500 Hz (24 bit A/D converter, accuracy 0.04 uV
per least significant bit). Blink artifacts and eye movements
were corrected with a regression-based algorithm (Gratton et al.,
1983). The EEG was epoched into 1500-ms segments, starting
from 1000 ms before the keypress and ending 500 ms after. To
correct for slow DC shifts, each epoch was linear detrended.
Then, each epoch was re-filtered with a 30 Hz low pass filter
(12 dB/oct) and baseline-corrected against the mean-voltage
recorded during a 200-ms period from 1000 to 800 ms preceding
keypress. Only epochs pertaining Trolley-type dilemmas were
retained for the Trolley group, and vice versa for the Footbridge
group. The epochs were then visually screened for artifact
and each epoch containing a voltage higher than ±80 µV in
any channel was rejected from further analysis. The remaining
epochs were averaged separately for each participant (mean
retained epochs for the Trolley group: 23.14, SD: 7.58; mean
retained epochs for the Footbridge group: 22.98, SD: 7.68).
The amplitude of the RP was measured in two time intervals
(Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006): (1) mean negativity between 800
and 500 ms before keypress (early RP); and (2) mean negativity
between 500 and 50 ms before keypress (late RP). Statistical
analyses were restricted to Cz since the RP measured at this
electrode reflects the activation of the SMA (Shibasaki and
Hallett, 2006), and since in the study by Gluth et al. (2013) the
potential recorded at Cz tracked the emergence of value-based
decisions.
For all the analyses performed on RP amplitude, the Dilemma
Type was a between-participants factor, since only Footbridge-
type dilemmas were included in the analyses for the Footbridge
group and only Trolley-type dilemmas were included in the
analyses for the Trolley group.
To compare the amplitude of the RP between dilemma types,
T-tests with Welch-corrected degrees of freedom were performed
separately for each time window.
To test whether the amplitude of the RP reflected emotional
conflict, an index of emotional conflict was calculated as the mean
difference between emotional intensities associated to chosen
vs. unchosen options, irrespective of whether they referred to
the utilitarian or non-utilitarian option, averaged across the
six emotions. Participants whose emotional conflict values were
negative are supposed to have experienced lower emotional
conflict during the task, since they tended to choose the option
associated with the lowest intensities of negative emotions,
thus following their emotion in their choice; participants
whose conflict values were close to zero are supposed to
have experienced greater conflict during the task, since they
did not clearly prefer one option over another based on
emotional intensities, and thus could not follow their emotion
in their choice; finally, participants whose conflict values were
positive are supposed to have experienced greater conflict since
on average they chose the option associated with the most
intense negative emotions, thus going directly against their
emotion in their choice. Linear regressions were calculated
separately for each emotion and time window, using the RP
amplitude as dependent variable and the emotional conflict as
predictor.
For both behavioral and electrophysiological data analyses
we calculated the approximate Bayes Factor (BF) through the
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), following the procedure
described in Wagenmakers (2007), in order to provide further
information on the probability of the effects given the data. This
is especially useful in case of null results: in the framework of
traditional null hypothesis testing, the failed rejection of the null
hypothesis (H0) is uninformative because it does not allow to
state whether the data actually support H0 or not. Conversely,
the BF allow to assess the relative likelihood of the null and
alternative (H1) hypotheses (Jarosz and Wiley, 2014). A BF10
greater than one implies that the data are more likely to occur
under H1 than under H0. Similarly, a BF10 lower than one
indicates that the data are more likely to occur under H0 than
under H1. A BF10 = 3, for instance, means that the data are
three times more likely to have occurred under H1 than under
H0. Following the guidelines by Etz and Vandekerckhove (2016),
BF10s between one and three are interpreted as ambiguous,
between 3 and 10 as moderately in favor of H1, larger than 10
as strongly in favor of H1.
All statistical analysis were performed in R (R Core Team,
2015), using the libraries stats (R Core Team, 2015), lme4 (Bates
et al., 2014), lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and effects (Fox,
1987).
RESULTS
Emotional Intensity Ratings
For each emotion, the best model included the interaction
between Dilemma Type and Option, which was always significant.
The posterior probabilities showed positive to very strong
evidence of the effect of option on emotional intensities being
modulated by the type of dilemma. The statistical results are
reported in Table 2 and the effects are displayed in Figure 2.
Follow-up analysis performed separately on Trolley-type
and Footbridge-type dilemmas (Tables 3 and 4, respectively)
showed that, as concerns anger, the interaction effect was
due to lower emotional intensities reported for utilitarian as
compared to non-utilitarian options in Trolley-type dilemmas
only. As concerns disgust, guilt and shame, the interaction
was due to higher emotional intensities reported for utilitarian
as compared to non-utilitarian options for both dilemma
types, and to this difference being more pronounced for
Footbridge-type as compared to Trolley-type dilemmas. As
concerns action regret, the interaction was due to higher
emotional intensities for utilitarian as compared to non-
utilitarian options in Footbridge-type dilemmas only. For
inaction regret, the interaction was due to lower emotional
intensities for utilitarian as compared to non-utilitarian options
in Trolley-type dilemmas and to higher emotional intensities for
utilitarian as compared to non-utilitarian options in Footbridge-
type dilemmas.
Choices
The Dilemma Type effect on choices was significant (B = −2.77,
SE = 0.26, z = −10.51, p < 0.001; χ2(1) = 65.38, p < 0.001):
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TABLE 2 | Linear regression mixed effects models depicting the Option × Dilemma Type interactions on emotional intensities.
Results on emotional intensity ratings
Emotion Model Log-likelihood
ratio test
Bayes Factor and
posterior probabilities
Fixed effects parameters
Anger Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 11.42,
p < 0.001
BF10 ≈ 4,76
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 83%
Option: B = −0.26, SE = 0.05, t(3924) = −5.14,
p < 0.001 Dilemma Type: B = −0.10, SE = 0.06,
t(127) = −1.48, p = 0.14 Option × Dilemma Type:
B = 0.24, SE = 0.07, t(3924) = 3.38, p < 0.001
Disgust Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 147.45,
p < 0.001
BF10 > 150
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99%
Option: B = 0.38, SE = 0.06, t(3923) = 6.00, p < 0.001
Dilemma type: B = −0.31, SE = 0.08, t(122) = −3.62,
p < 0.001 Option × Dilemma Type: B = 1.10, SE = 0.09,
t(3923) = 12.25, p < 0.001
Guilt Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 222.49,
p < 0.001
BF10 > 150
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99%
Option: B = 0.43, SE = 0.06, t(3928) = 6.67, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −0.84, SE = 0.10, t(116) = −8.57,
p < 0.001 Option × Dilemma Type: B = 1.36, SE = 0.09,
t(3928) = 15.13, p < 0.001
Action regret Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 199.21,
p < 0.001
BF10 > 150
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99%
Option: B = −0.03, SE = 0.06, t(3923) = −0.48, p = 0.63
Dilemma Type: B = −0.67, SE = 0.08, t(121) = −8.19,
p < 0.001 Option × Dilemma Type: B = 1.24, SE = 0.09,
t(3923) = 14.29, p < 0.001
Inaction regret Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 118.44,
p < 0.001
BF10 > 150
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99%
Option: B = −0.53, SE = 0.06, t(3922) = −8.38,
p < 0.001 Dilemma Type: B = −0.54, SE = 0.07,
t(124) = −6.97, p < 0.001 Option × Dilemma Type:
B = 0.97, SE = 0.09, t(3922) = 10.96, p < 0.001
Shame Option × Dilemma type χ2(1) = 262.6,
p < 0.001
BF10 > 150
Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99%
Option: B = 0.61, SE = 0.07, t(3925) = 8.65, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −0.9, SE = 0.1, t(121) = −9.14,
p < 0.001 Option × Dilemma Type: B = 1.62, SE = 0.1,
t(3925) = 16.47, p < 0.001
The log-likelihood ratio test and the Bayes Factors (BFs) compare the depicted models with the models including Option and Dilemma Type, but no interaction. The factor
Option was dummy-coded so that non-utilitarian options were 0 and utilitarian options were 1. The factor Dilemma Type was dummy-coded so that Trolley-type dilemmas
were 0 and Footbridge-type dilemmas were 1.
the probability of choosing the utilitarian option was higher
in Trolley-type as compared with Footbridge-type dilemmas
(0.82 in Trolley-type dilemmas, 95% CI = [0.75, 0.88]; 0.23 in
Footbridge-type dilemmas, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.32]). As indicated
by the approximate Bayes Factor (BF10 > 150) the posterior
probability of choices being modulated by dilemma type was
Pr(H1|D)≈ 99%.
The model that included as predictors the emotional intensity
difference indexes calculated for each of the six emotions
was significant [χ2(6) = 200.89, p < 0.001, BF10 > 150,
Pr(H1|D) ≈ 99%), indicating that emotions did play a role in
driving choices. Crucially, including Dilemma Type in the model
significantly improved it [χ2(1) = 49.09, p < 0.001, BF10 > 150,
Pr(H1|D) ≈ 99%; Dilemma type effect: B = −2.34, SE = 0.27,
z = −8.51, p < 0.001], showing that differences in emotional
intensities do not fully explain the difference in choices for the
two dilemma types.
To further investigate the effect of each emotion on choices, we
calculated an additional set of model separately for each emotion.
For each emotion, including emotional intensity difference in
the model with only the random effects significantly improved it
[guilt:χ2(1)= 84.31, p< 0.001; disgust:χ2(1)= 57.07, p< 0.001;
anger: χ2(1) = 64.01, p < 0.001; action regret: χ2(1) = 56.61,
p < 0.001; inaction regret: χ2(1) = 61.49, p < 0.001; shame:
χ2(1)= 52.67, p< 0.001], and the posterior probability of choices
being influenced by differential intensity were Pr(H1|D) ≈ 99%
(BFs10 > 150) for every emotion. Introducing Dilemma Type
significantly improved the models, and the approximate BFs
indicated strong evidence for choices being influenced by the
type of dilemma in addition to emotional intensity difference
(Table 5). The models with the interaction effect did not
significantly differ from the models with the two main effects
[guilt: χ2(1) = 3.79, p = 0.05; disgust: χ2(1) = 1.92, p = 0.16;
anger: χ2(1) = 0.001, p = 0.97; action regret: χ2(1) = 0.36,
p = 0.55; inaction regret: χ2(1) = 0.17, p = 0.68; shame:
χ2(1) = 0.42, p = 0.52]. For guilt, the interaction term was
significant (B = −0.13, SD = 0.07, z = −2.0, p = 0.049), but
the posterior probability of dilemma type modulating the effect of
differential guilt intensities on choices was only Pr(H1|D) ≈ 13%
(BF10 ≈ 0.15), and thus the significant interaction was probably
a spurious effect. For the other emotions, the interaction term
was non-significant (all ps > 0.15) and the posterior probability
of the interaction was Pr(H1|D) ≈ 5% (BF10 ≈ 0.06) for
disgust, Pr(H1|D) ≈ 2%, BF10 ≈ 0.02 for anger, Pr(H1|D) ≈ 3%,
BF10 ≈ 0.03 for action regret, Pr(H1|D) ≈ 6%, BF10 ≈ 0.06 for
inaction regret, and Pr(H1|D)≈ 2%, BF10 ≈ 0.02 for shame.
Thus, for each emotion the difference in emotional intensities
between the utilitarian and the non-utilitarian options was
negatively associated with the probability to choose the utilitarian
option: the greater the emotional intensities for the utilitarian
option as compared to the non-utilitarian option, the lower
the probability to choose the utilitarian option, and vice
versa. This effect was not influenced by the type of dilemma
(Figure 3).
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of Dilemma Type on emotional intensities as a function of Option. The scales ranged from 0 (no intensity) to 6 (maximal intensity). Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Electrophysiological Data
Grand-averaged MRPs recorded at Cz before choice in the
Footbridge and Trolley groups are displayed in Figure 4.
Early Readiness Potential
The Dilemma Type effect was not significant: the amplitude of
the early RP did not differ between the Footbridge and the Trolley
groups [t(40.71)= 1.17, p= 0.25]. The approximate BF indicates
ambiguous evidence in favor of a difference between groups (BF10
≈2.02, Pr(H1|D)≈ 0.67).
As concerns the influence of emotional conflict on the
amplitude of the early RP, the model was not significant
(R2 = 0.01, p = 0.51, β = −0.14, p = 0.51). The approximate
BFs indicate no clear evidence in favor of either the alternative or
the null hypothesis [BF10 ≈1.26, Pr(H1|D)≈ 0.56].
Late Readiness Potential
Similar results were obtained for the late RP. The comparison
between the Footbridge and Trolley groups was not significant
[t(39.35) = 1.3, p = 0.20], and there was weak evidence
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TABLE 3 | Linear regression mixed effects models depicting the effects of Option on emotional intensities in Trolley-type dilemmas.
Results on emotional intensity ratings – Trolley-type dilemmas only
Emotion Model Log-likelihood
ratio test
Bayes Factor and posterior
probabilities
Fixed effects parameters
Anger Option χ2(1) = 25.44, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = −0.26, SE = 0.05, t(1944) = −5.06, p < 0.001
Disgust Option χ2(1) = 36.58, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 0.38, SE = 0.06, t(1947) = 6.07, p < 0.001
Guilt Option χ2(1) = 48.55, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 0.43, SE = 0.06, t(1948) = 7.01, p < 0.001
Action regret Option χ2(1) = 0.25, p = 0.62 BF10 ≈ 0.02 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 2% Option: B = −0.03, SE = 0.06, t(1945) = −0.5, p = 0.62
Inaction regret Option χ2(1) = 76.98, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = −0.53, SE = 0.06, t(1945) = −8.86, p < 0.001
Shame Option χ2(1) = 79.09, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 0.61, SE = 0.07, t(1949) = 8.98, p < 0.001
The log-likelihood ratio test and the BFs compare the depicted models with the models including only the random effects. The factor Option was dummy-coded so that
non-utilitarian options were 0 and utilitarian options were 1.
TABLE 4 | Linear regression mixed effects models depicting the effects of Option on emotional intensities in Footbridge-type dilemmas.
Results on emotional intensity ratings – Footbridge-type dilemmas only
Emotion Model Log-likelihood
ratio test
Bayes Factor and posterior
probabilities
Fixed effects parameters
Anger Option χ2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.72 BF10 ≈ 0.02 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 2% Option: B = −0.02, SE = 0.05, t(1929) = −0.36, p = 0.72
Disgust Option χ2(1) = 482.17, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 1.48, SE = 0.06, t(1928) = 23.40, p < 0.001
Guilt Option χ2(1) = 620.97, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 1.79, SE = 0.07, t(1930) = 27.06, p < 0.001
Action regret Option χ2(1) = 342.72, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 1.21, SE = 0.06, t(1925) = 19.36, p < 0.001
Inaction regret Option χ2(1) = 46.14, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 0.49, SE = 0.06, t(1924) = 6.83, p < 0.001
Shame Option χ2(1) = 801.59, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% Option: B = 2.25, SE = 0.07, t(1929) = 31.52, p < 0.001
The log-likelihood ratio test and the BFs compare the depicted models with the models including only the random effects. The factor Option was dummy-coded so that
non-utilitarian options were 0 and utilitarian options were 1.
TABLE 5 | Logistic regression models depicting the effects of Emotional Intensity Difference (EID) and Dilemma Type on the probability of choosing the
utilitarian option.
Effects of EID and Dilemma Type on utilitarian choices
Emotion Model Log-likelihood
ratio test
Bayes Factor and posterior
probabilities
Fixed effects parameters
Anger EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 64.01, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.18, SE = 0.04, z = −4.12, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.74, SE = 0.24, z = −10.35,
p < 0.001
Disgust EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 57.07, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.27, SE = 0.04, z = −7.41, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.58, SE = 0.27, z = −9.48,
p < 0.001
Guilt EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 53.51, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.30, SE = 0.04, z = −8.30, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.51, SE = 0.28, z = −9.06,
p < 0.001
Action regret EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 56.61, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.37, SE = 0.04, z = −9.83, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.51, SE = 0.27, z = −9.41,
p < 0.001
Inaction regret EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 61.49, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.38, SE = 0.04, z = −10.58, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.59, SE = 0.26, z = −9.99,
p < 0.001
Shame EID + Dilemma Type χ2(1) = 52.67, p < 0.001 BF10 > 150 Pr(H1 |D) ≈ 99% EID: B = −0.28, SE = 0.03, z = −8.47, p < 0.001
Dilemma Type: B = −2.47, SE = 0.27, z = −8.94,
p < 0.001
The log-likelihood ratio test and the BFs compare the depicted models with the models including only EID as fixed effect.
in favor of a difference between groups [BF10 ≈ 2.36,
Pr(H1|D) ≈ 0.70]. As for the previous time-window, the
model investigating the effect of emotional conflict on the
amplitude of the late RP was not significant (R2 = 0.03,
p = 0.30, β = −0.36, p = 0.30). The approximate
BFs indicate ambiguous evidence in favor of an effect
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FIGURE 3 | Relationship between emotional intensity difference and probability of choosing the utilitarian option, represented separately for
dilemma type. Positive emotional intensity differences indicate that the utilitarian option was associated with stronger intensities than the non-utilitarian option.
Negative emotional intensity differences indicate that the non-utilitarian option was associated with stronger emotional intensities than the utilitarian option. Shaded
areas indicate 95% confidence intervals. The unequal spacing of the ticks in the y axes are because graphs are plotted on the logit scale, but the y axes are labeled
on the scale of the probability of choosing the utilitarian option, after conversion from the logit scale.
of emotional conflict on RP amplitude (BF10 ≈ 1.75,
Pr(H1|D)≈ 0.64).
DISCUSSION
The main aim of this study was to investigate the role of
anticipated post-decisional emotions in driving decisions in
moral dilemmas. Through self-report ratings, we measured the
emotional state experienced by participants both after their
choice and after imagining to have chosen the alternative option.
The emotional state was measured on six emotions that we
hypothesized to be relevant in the resolution of this kind
of dilemmas: regret [specified as action and inaction regret,
according to the different terms used in Italian (Giorgetta et al.,
2012)], guilt, shame, anger, and disgust. Thus, for every dilemma
we collected the intensity of these emotions twice, one for
each option (utilitarian and non-utilitarian), and we analyzed it
irrespective of what participants decided. We hypothesized that,
if individuals spontaneously anticipate the emotions they would
feel after the decision and use this information as input in the
decision process, then the difference between the emotional states
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FIGURE 4 | Grand-averaged MRPs recorded at Cz time-locked to the behavioral response (choice) in the Trolley and Footbridge groups. Time 0
indicates the onset of the behavioral response.
related to the two alternatives, i.e., the utilitarian and the non-
utilitarian option, would predict participant’s choices. As a second
aim of the study, we investigated whether the RP might reflect
emotional conflict in the context of moral dilemmas.
As for the behavioral data, we found two main results. First,
utilitarian and non-utilitarian options elicited different emotional
intensities as a function of the two dilemma types, with most
emotions highlighting larger differences for Footbridge- than
Trolley-type dilemmas. Second, the difference between emotional
intensities associated with the two options predicted choices
irrespective of dilemma type, suggesting that participants chose
the option with the least emotional cost even in Trolley-type
dilemmas.
As for the EEG data, our results were inconclusive, as they
did not provide strong evidence either in favor or against our
hypothesis. The results will be discussed in detail in the following
paragraphs.
According to Greene et al. (2001, 2004) dual process model
utilitarian options are rejected in Footbridge-type dilemmas
because they evoke strong aversive emotional reactions. Thus,
we hypothesized that, in Footbridge-type dilemmas, utilitarian
options would be associated with higher negative emotional
consequences as compared to non-utilitarian options. In Trolley-
type dilemmas, in contrast, we anticipated the difference between
the emotional consequences of the two options to be smaller,
since according to Greene et al.’s (2001, 2004) model the
utilitarian option should not elicit such strong emotional
reactions in these dilemmas.
Results on emotional intensities of guilt, shame, and disgust
were largely consistent with our hypothesis: the intensity of these
emotions was higher for the utilitarian choices as compared to
the non-utilitarian choices in Footbridge-type dilemmas, and
this difference was significantly lower (but still present) for
Trolley-type dilemmas. Thus, sacrificing one person to save more
people (utilitarian option) elicits more intense self-condemning
emotions than letting some people die (non-utilitarian option),
and this effect is especially pronounced when the sacrifice is
performed intentionally (i.e., as a means to an end), as in
Footbridge-type dilemmas. Sacrificing one person intentionally
also elicited more action regret than letting some people die,
whereas sacrificing one person as a side effect, as in Trolley-type
dilemmas, did not, in line with an account of regret as being
strongly influenced by agency and personal responsibility (e.g.,
Zeelenberg et al., 2000; Giorgetta et al., 2012; Wagner et al., 2012).
Results on anger and inaction regret, on the other hand,
followed a different trend. Anger was stronger for non-
utilitarian options in Trolley-type dilemmas only (albeit this
effect was weak), with no difference emerging for Footbridge-
type dilemmas. Thus, the intensity of anger was reduced by
choosing the utilitarian option, as compared to choosing the non-
utilitarian option. This is in line with results reported by Choe
and Min (2011), who showed that high trait anger was positively
associated with utilitarianism, and by Ugazio et al. (2012), who
showed that inducing anger in participants before a moral
dilemma task, increased the percentage of utilitarian choices. This
positive relationship between anger and the utilitarian choice
could be due to the fact that anger is an approach-related
emotion entailing a motivation to act, and the utilitarian choice
in moral dilemmas entails action, whereas the non-utilitarian
choice entails inaction. Consistent with this interpretation, we
found inaction regret to be stronger for the non-utilitarian option
as compared to the utilitarian one in Trolley-type dilemmas.
These results importantly indicate that in the case of Trolley-
type dilemmas, choosing the utilitarian option is not only
backed up by a rational cost-benefit analysis (e.g., Greene et al.,
2001, 2004), but also by the need to avoid stronger feelings
of inaction regret and anger. This is in line with other results
reporting a positive relationship between emotional activation
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and utilitarian choices in Trolley-type dilemmas (Patil et al.,
2014).
The fact that in Footbridge-type dilemmas inaction regret
was higher for the utilitarian than for the non-utilitarian option
might seem counterintuitive. Whereas in Trolley-type dilemmas
inaction regret seems to be especially elicited by the negative
consequences caused by inaction (letting some people die,
in Footbridge-type dilemmas this emotion closely follows the
pattern observed for guilt, shame, disgust, and action regret),
and seems to be more strongly elicited by the aversive impact
of intentional killing, which entails action rather than inaction.
Further research should address what factors might modulate the
intensity of this emotion.
Crucially, as concerns the effect of emotion on choices,
our data are in line with the hypothesis that individuals
choose the option with the lower anticipated emotional
consequences: for each emotion, the difference in emotional
intensity between utilitarian and non-utilitarian options was
significantly associated with choices, indicating that participants
chose the option with the least aversive emotional consequences.
Interestingly, however, this effect was not modulated by the
type of dilemma: not only in Footbridge-type dilemmas, as
can be hypothesized based on the dual process theory (Greene
et al., 2004, 2001), but also in Trolley-type dilemmas choices
were influenced by emotion. This differs from what emerged in
Tasso et al. (unpublished), who reported a significant association
between emotional intensities and choices for Footbridge-type
dilemmas only. However, Tasso et al. (unpublished) only analyzed
those trials in which participants provided typical choices
(i.e., utilitarian in Trolley-type dilemmas and non-utilitarian
in Footbridge-type dilemmas). In contrast, the present study
included all trials in the analyses, thus providing a more complete
picture of the mechanisms at play.
Our results indicate that the option associated to the least
intense negative emotions had a higher probability of being
chosen, and this effect had the same magnitude in both dilemma
types. However, based on the analyses on emotional ratings, we
found that in Footbridge-type dilemmas the utilitarian option
elicited overall higher emotional intensities as compared to the
non-utilitarian one. This effect was observed for all the emotions
that we tested, except for anger, which had comparable intensities
for the two options. On the other hand, in Trolley-type dilemmas,
the intensity of anger and inaction regret was higher for the non-
utilitarian than the utilitarian option, whereas the intensity of
disgust, guilt, and shame was higher for the utilitarian than for
the non-utilitarian one, with these differences being smaller than
those emerged for Footbridge-type dilemmas. Thus, our data
suggest that, even though anticipating post-decisional emotions
influenced choice probability in both Trolley- and Footbridge-
type dilemmas, it is more likely that individuals choose the non-
utilitarian option in Footbridge- than in Trolley-type dilemmas,
because it elicited on average stronger emotional intensities in the
former dilemmas than in the latter.
Our data on the effect of emotion on choice provided another
important result: with emotional intensities held constant,
the probability of choosing the utilitarian option was higher
in Trolley-type than in Footbridge-type dilemmas. Thus, the
different probability of choosing the utilitarian option that
emerges between Trolley-type and Footbridge-type dilemmas
cannot be exclusively attributed to differences in emotional
intensities between dilemma types. This is in line with what
reported by Horne and Powell (2016), who found that emotional
reactions only partially explained the difference in moral
judgment between Trolley-type and Footbridge-type dilemmas.
Several additional process can be hypothesized to account
for the residual difference. First, drawing again from the dual
process model (Greene et al., 2001, 2004), we can hypothesize
that Trolley-type dilemmas, as compared to Footbridge-type
dilemmas, activate more strongly cognitive processes such as
reflection and reasoning, which would favor the utilitarian
resolution.
Another relevant factor that could differentiate between
dilemma types might be the representation of rules. According
to the studies of Nichols (2002) and Nichols and Mallon (2006),
individuals’ moral judgments are based not only on the emotional
reactions elicited by the outcomes of an action, but also on a
normative theory – that is, a body of norms describing what
is allowed and what is not that would be acquired during the
development (Nichols, 2002). As is the case for other types of
rules, it can be hypothesized that moral rules are stored in long-
term memory (Bunge, 2004). Even though emotional reactions
play an important role in the formation and implementation
of moral norms (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2008; Buckholtz
and Marois, 2012), it might be the representation of a rule
against killing that contribute to the difference in responding to
Footbridge- and Trolley-type dilemmas. Since killing a person in
Footbridge-type dilemmas is perceived as more intentional than
in Trolley-type dilemmas, the rule violation would be more severe
in Footbridge-type dilemmas (cf. Cushman and Young, 2011).
This might reduce the probability of choosing the utilitarian
option.
As a third possibility, the difference in the probability of
choosing the utilitarian option in the two dilemma types might
be due to other emotions that we did not measure in the present
study (e.g., empathy for the victims). Previous literature showed
that the disposition to feel empathic concern and personal
distress in front of the suffering of others was inversely associated
with the endorsement of the utilitarian option (Gleichgerrcht
and Young, 2013; Sarlo et al., 2014; Spino and Cummins, 2014;
Patil et al., 2016). Personal distress, in particular, predicted the
percentage of utilitarian choices in Footbridge-type, but not in
Trolley-type dilemmas (Sarlo et al., 2014). Moreover, the present
study did not investigate whether the emotions reported by
participants were elicited by the outcome of the action (i.e., the
victims) or by the harmful action itself (i.e., killing). A recent
theoretical model of moral decision posits that these two sources
of emotions are differentially engaged by different dilemma
types, with Trolley-type dilemmas eliciting more outcome-based
emotions and Footbridge-type dilemmas more action-based
emotions (Cushman et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2014). It would
be interesting in future studies to ask participants to specifically
report emotions elicited by these different features of decision-
making, in order to disentangle their effects on choices and to
determine how they are modulated by dilemma types.
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Finally, it is important to stress that in our study the
self-report measures only captured the hypothetical emotional
consequences that participants were aware of, leaving out the
unconscious emotional reactions developing during or after
decision-making. This is a crucial point, because affective
reactions do not need to reach awareness in order to
influence decisions and behaviors (e.g., Damasio, 1994). Thus,
this research only captured a part of the emotional states
elicited by the resolution of moral dilemmas – that is, those
that participants consciously perceived – and might have
underestimated the effect of emotion on decisions, and their
impact in differentiating between Trolley-type and Footbridge-
type dilemmas
As for the electrophysiological data, in the present study the
amplitude of the RP, as opposed to previous results reported by
Sarlo et al. (2012), did not discriminate between Trolley-type and
Footbridge-type dilemmas, with the BF indicating weak evidence
in favor of a difference. This might be due to the fact that,
as opposed to Sarlo et al. (2012), we analyzed the RP using a
between-participants design, which increased the variability of
the data, thus reducing statistical power.
Also, we did not find concrete evidence pointing toward a
relationship between the RP amplitude and the emotional conflict
index, which was calculated by averaging the differences between
the emotional intensity associated with the unchosen vs. the
chosen one. The lack of any relationship might indicate that
anticipated emotions did not influence the neural correlates of
the last phase of decision-making, but possibly played a role in
the earlier stages. As an alternative, it might indicate that the
RP, in this context, does not reflect an emotional conflict, but a
more general form of conflict arising from different processes.
Future research might devise a more comprehensive measure
of conflict – measuring, for instance, cognitive preferences in
addition to emotional consequences – and test its relationship
with the RP amplitude. In any case, it is also important to
point out that the BFs for these null results were close to one,
indicating almost equal probability between the null hypothesis
and the alternative one. For this reason, we cannot exclude
the possibility that a relationship between the RP amplitude
and the emotional conflict does exist, but did not emerge in
the present data due to lack of statistical power. Thus, the
functional role of the RP in the context of moral decisions and
its relationship to conflict and to emotional processing requires
further investigation.
As a main limitation of the present study, it is important
to stress that in our paradigm we did not measure anticipated
emotions directly. Rather, we measured post-decisional and
counterfactual emotions, and hypothesized participants to
spontaneously anticipate these emotions during the decision.
Some studies indicate that individuals are not always accurate
in predicting how they would feel after making a choice, and
that there is often a discrepancy between anticipated emotions
and actual post-decisional emotions (Wilson and Gilbert, 2005).
In the context of moral dilemmas, however, all the decisions
that participants made are hypothetical, and participants are
not confronted with real consequences. For this reason, we can
expect post-decisional emotional ratings to reflect the emotional
consequences that participants anticipated while they were
making their choices. However, it cannot be excluded that the
decision itself influenced post-decisional emotional evaluations.
In any case, if we asked participants to report anticipated
emotions before the decision, we would have probably biased
participants to take emotions into account more than they would
have done spontaneously, and thus our findings on choices would
have been altered. Thus, we believe our paradigm was a good
compromise allowing the study of the role played by anticipated
emotions in moral dilemmas without generating considerable
modifications to the decision process itself.
The results reported in this study indicate that in moral
dilemmas participants choose the option that minimized the
intensity of the aversive emotions experienced after the decision.
This effect was present in both dilemma types and did not
eliminate the differences in the probability of choosing the
utilitarian option for the two dilemma types. This study thus
provides useful indications for the understanding of how
emotions influence the resolution of moral dilemmas. Future
studies should investigate if the difference between Trolley- and
Footbridge-type dilemmas that is not explained by anticipated
emotions is due to the contribution of reflection and reasoning,
rules, unconscious emotional reactions, or to an interplay
between these factors.
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